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 Managing Forests for Sustainable Economic Development: 
Optimal Use and Conservation of Forests 
ABSTRACT 
The conservation of natural forests contributes significantly to the goal of achieving 
sustainable economic development. There is, however, growing concern that natural 
forests (which provide tangible and intangible economic benefits to humankind) are 
being lost at a rate which (combined with other factors) seriously threatens sustainable 
economic development because of the environmental and social impacts of such loss. 
There is little doubt that in order to achieve sustainable development, multifunctional 
forest ecosystems (as well as other important ecosystems) need to be managed 
appropriately. However, determining the socially optimal level of conservation and 
use of forests is a challenging task. From a human point of view, it is clearly not 
optimal to conserve all natural forests. In other words, only some conservation of 
natural forest is socially optimal. The extent to which (traditional) neoclassical 
economics elucidates the matter is explored. It is found that due to market failures, a 
larger amount of forest conversion occurs than is socially optimal as determined by 
the application of traditional welfare economics. Nevertheless, neoclassical 
economics fails to address adequately the requirements for sustainable economic 
development. When the goal of economic sustainability is taken into account, even 
less forest conversion than recommended by neoclassical economics is socially 
optimal. Some economists (for example, Ramsey and Pigou) claim that the 
sustainability shortcoming of neoclassical economics can be overcome by applying a 
zero discount rate in making decisions about resource use. This, however, does not 
solve the problem because it does not give enough weight to the welfare of future 
generations and may result in too much forest conversion from an economic 
sustainability viewpoint. In general, variations in the discount rate are ineffective as a 
means for determining measures that ensure sustainable economic development. This 
finding seriously undermines established economic theory. 
Keywords: Discount rates, ecosystem services, environmental conservation, forests, 
intergenerational equity, multifunctionality, resource economics, sustainable 
development. 
JEL Classifications: Q20, Q23, Q56, Q57. 
 
 Managing Forests for Sustainable Economic Development: 
Optimal Use and Conservation of Forests 
1. Introduction 
Natural forests are complex multifunctional ecosystems the conservation of which 
contributes to sustainable economic development. Ecosystem services that enable 
forest to contribute to economic sustainability include: 
(1) their role as carbon sinks and stores; 
(2) their favourable impacts on local climates; 
(3) their conservation of genetic diversity; 
(4) their supply of hydrologic (water) services of value regionally; and 
(5) their role in reducing rates of soil erosion. This, in turn, generates 
several positive externalities such as less silting of dams and forests 
and the avoidance of reduced fish populations. 
Furthermore, natural forests are a renewable resource and can be used to a limited 
extent by humans for consumptive purposes without significantly eroding their 
provision of other valuable ecosystem services. Indeed, in some cases, limited use of 
forests by humans can add to the value of the other ecosystem services provided by 
forest, for example, the amount of biodiversity conserved in forests. Moreover, 
sometimes natural forests (and some human modified forests) provide valuable social 
safety nets for local communities (Lipton, 1985) and are especially important in 
helping satisfy the needs of the poor and in providing employment opportunities for 
females, as has been documented, for instance, in India (Tisdell et al., 2002). 
Natural forests are not the only types of ecosystems contributing to economic 
sustainability. The conservation of other natural ecosystems as well as some human 
engineered ecosystems (such as agroecosystems) also plays a role in promoting 
sustainable economic development. Nevertheless, most concern appears to have been 
expressed about the rate at which deforestation is occurring globally and especially, 
about the loss of natural forests. Despite this, the conservation of all natural forests is 
unlikely to be socially optimal and the extent to which forests must be conserved to 
achieve economic sustainability is subject to debate. 
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 Neoclassical economics emphasizes the opportunity costs involved in decisions about 
resource use, and can be applied to the allocation of land use. Its implications for the 
conversion of forested areas to alternative uses are explored. It is however, found that 
neoclassical economic theory pays insufficient attention to economic sustainability. 
When economic sustainability is taken into account greater conservation of forests 
and natural ecosystems is called for than indicated by neoclassical economics. Each of 
these matters are considered in turn and are followed by a general discussion of the 
issues raised. 
2. Neoclassical Economics and the Optimal Conversion of Natural Forests to 
Alternative Uses 
Historically, the general trend has been to convert land containing natural forests to 
alternative users. Neoclassical economic theory indicates that some such conversion 
(as well as conversion of many areas supporting other natural ecosystems) is likely to 
be socially optimal if Pareto’s criterion is adopted. Pareto (1927) argued that if 
economic welfare is to be at a maximum it must be impossible by reallocating 
available resources to make anyone better off without making another worse off. 
Neoclassical economists argue that some conversion of natural areas is needed to 
enable human wants to be more fully satisfied given the limited availability of 
resources. 
In its simplest form, the position of neoclassical economics concerning optimal land 
use can be illustrated by Figure 1. There the curve ACE represents the supply of 
commodities that can be obtained by reducing the area of a forest. The curve marked 
W1W1 is an indifference curve showing the relative value that the community places 
on forested land and the commodities that can be produced by its conversion to 
alternative uses. It should, however, be noted that the use of social indifference curves 
ought to be merely regarded as a convenient simplification. Although the concept of a 
social welfare function developed by Bergson (1938) is useful for expository purposes, 
as Arrow (1954) points out, it is often impossible to derive such a function from the 
preferences of individuals in a way that satisfies acceptable axioms. Given the 
representation shown in Figure 1 the socially optimal choice corresponds to point C. 
This implies that AG of the forested area should be converted to alternative uses and 
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 that OG ought to remain as forest. The combination at point B would involve 
insufficient forest conversion to minimize economic scarcity (given this theory) and 
conversion corresponding to point D would include too much conversion to minimize 
economic scarcity. 
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Figure 1: The socially optimal level of forest conversion as suggested by 
neoclassical economic theory corresponds to point C in this case. 
As a result of market failures, neoclassical economist concede that too much forest 
conversion may occur, that is, conversion corresponding to a point like D may take 
place. While this is a useful observation, neoclassical economic theory suffers from 
several serious limitations when the dynamics of economic systems are taken into 
account. Its application (in practice) tends to be based on current preferences and 
transformation possibilities for natural resources and to a large extend ignores the 
needs of future generations, especially the importance of conserving sufficient natural 
capital to maintain the income levels of future generations. Let us therefore, consider 
economic sustainability issues that need to be taken into account when considering the 
optimality of forest conversion. 
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 3. Sustainability Issues that should be Considered in Forest Conversion and 
Afforestation 
Neo-Malthusian economists argue that achieving the goal of sustainable development 
requires the conservation of an adequate amount of natural capital, including natural 
forests. (Pearce et al., 1989; Tisdell, 2005, pp.248-251) and many have expressed 
concern that reduced levels of natural capital as a result of economic activity are, in 
practice, on the verge of causing a substantial collapse in future levels of per capita 
income. For example, greenhouse gas emissions are causing the atmosphere to change 
its properties and are expected to result in significant global warming and rises in sea 
levels in this century unless rapid and sufficient action is taken to reduce the level of 
these emissions (IPCC, 2007). As a result, levels of sustainable income are expected 
to fall globally in the absence of appropriate aversive action (Stern, 2007; Tisdell, 
2009, Ch.11) 
The neo-Malthusian point of view about the likelihood of unsuitable economic 
development can be illustrated by a couple of diagrams. With the passage of time the 
amount of natural capital globally has declined as a result of its conversion into man-
made capital and its consumption. Assume that the sustainable level of per capita 
income or level of welfare can be related to the amount of natural capital that exists. 
One possibility is illustrated in Figure 2. Initially, there may be no conversion and the 
level of sustainable income might be close to the subsistence level, for example, might 
correspond to point A in Figure 2. As economic development proceeds, the actual and 
sustainable level of income might follow a path like that shown by curve ABCD in 
Figure 2. As a result of some reduction in natural capital (as a result of its conversion 
to other purposes, such as man-made capital), sustainable levels of per capita income 
rise at first. They reach a maximum in the case illustrated when a quantity of R1 of 
natural assets is converted to other uses as a result of economic activity. Further 
conversion results in a reduction in the level of sustainable income. Many neo-
Malthusians are concerned that globally the reduction in natural assets already 
exceeds R1 (or is about to exceed it) and that per capita incomes can be expected to 
decline in the future. If further conversion of natural capital occurs, an even greater 
decline in the level of future income is expected. 
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Figure 2: The availability of natural resources plays an important role in 
sustaining income levels. Some conversion of natural resources is 
necessary to increase the level of sustainable income but if there is a 
large reduction in natural capital, this can cause the level of 
sustainable income to fall. 
To a considerable extent, the conversion of natural capital to provide economic 
commodities is irreversible. In the case illustrated in Figure 1, the decline in the level 
of per capita income is shown to be gradual once the reduction in the level of natural 
capital exceeds R1. However, it is also possible that the decline could be abrupt once 
some threshold level of conversion of natural capital occurs. Consequently, there may 
be little or no advance warning of this impending irreversible collapse in income 
levels. An example of this type of situation is illustrated in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: In the case illustrated, there is catastrophic irreversible fall in the 
level of sustainable per capita income when the level of reduction in 
natural capital exceeds R1. Little or no prior indication of such a 
disaster may occur. 
The above possibilities should not be dismissed as fanciful. The challenge empirically 
is to determine what levels of conservation of natural resources and what types of 
natural resources need to be conserved to avoid lack of economic sustainability. 
Deciding on this is complicated because in many instances, the solutions are not fixed 
ones but are conditional. For example, additions to forested areas can help fight 
against global warming by sequestering carbon dioxide (Hunt, 2009). How effective 
reforestation and afforestation is likely to be in that regard depends on the level of 
greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, from the use of fossil fuels. For example, 
suppose that it is argued that in order to avoid adverse economic consequences from 
global warming that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere should not exceed Z parts 
per million in terms of CO2 equivalent. Other things unaltered, suppose that 
greenhouse gas emissions from the use of fossil fuels will result in the threshold, Z, 
being exceeded. By adding to forest areas, it may be possible for a time to absorb the 
excess carbon dioxide that would otherwise be in the atmosphere. The scope for such 
absorption is nevertheless limited. 
Additions to forests will need to rise with the level of CO2 being emitted as a result of 
the use of fossil fuels if the forest additions are to absorb the excess CO2 being 
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 emitted. The rate at which newly established forests sequester CO2 varies with their 
age. Their rate of sequestration increases at first with their age, then declines and at 
maturity of the forest is zero or close to zero. Consequently, additions to forested 
areas only reduce potential CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere for a limited period 
of time. Afforestation and reforestation are stop-gap measures and not a long-term 
solution to excessive levels of CO2 emissions from the concentration of fossil fuels 
which are the prime contributor to global warming. While forest additions can play a 
role in moderating the rate of accumulation of CO2 in the short to medium term, they 
do not provide a permanent long-term solution to the global warming problem posed 
by excessive use of fossil fuels. At best, they buy time. On the other hand, loss of 
existing forests adds to CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere and exacerbates the 
problem of global warming.  
4. Intergenerational Equity and the Use of Forested Land (Forest Conversion) 
Neoclassical economics does not adequately address the equitable distribution of 
resource availability between generations, nor as a matter of fact, does it provide 
much guidance on the just distribution of income between existing individuals. 
However, when considering economic sustainability, the equitable distribution of 
income between generations should not be ignored. 
It has been claimed that a sustainable development policy should ensure that the 
income (welfare) of each future generation be not less than that of its predecessor. 
This requirement is usually based on Rawls’ principle of justice (Rawls, 1971). 
Nevertheless, as pointed out elsewhere, this principle is deficient in some respects 
(Tisdell, 1999). 
An alternative basis for this aim could be that it is usually observed that each 
generation of parents hopes that their children (and grandchildren) will be at least as 
well off as they are and usually hope they will be better off. If this is so for each 
succeeding generation of parents, then it implies the sustainability rule mentioned 
above. This is an empirically based rule unlike that attributed by Rawls which is a 
philosophically based one. This empirically based rule avoids some of the theoretical 
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 flaws in Rawls’ rule. Nevertheless, even this rule is not socially appropriate in all 
circumstances as will be illustrated shortly with reference to forestry policies. 
In assessing the social desirability of alternative development strategies, we need to 
distinguish between different criteria or rules which may be applied for this purpose. 
A chosen development strategy might be expected to satisfy a selection of the 
following rules: 
(1) ensure no deterioration in the per capita income (welfare) of each 
succeeding generation compared with its predecessor (a rule based on 
Rawls’ principle of justice or on Tisdell’s theory of the observed 
preferences of each generation of parents); 
(2) maximizes the cumulative  income (welfare) of all who will ever live 
in the future; 
(3) maximizes the cumulative discounted income of all who will live in the 
future; 
(4) meets condition (2) or (3) but ensures that the per capita incomes or 
welfare of no future generation falls below a critical value; and 
(5) ensures that a Paretian dominant strategy is selected in preference to 
Paretian inferior ones. A Paretian dominant strategy enables all future 
generations to be better off compared to alternative strategies. 
Assume that the population that will be born in each generation is a predetermined 
variable and that the human race only continues to exist for a limited period of time. 
Then given Rawls’ theory that any individual could be born into any generation and 
lives only once, application of Rule (2) maximizes the expected income of each 
individual to be born, it being assumed that the probability of being born into any 
generation is equal to the population in that generation divided by the total population 
to be born. As I have argued elsewhere (Tisdell, 1999), if all to be born were to confer 
behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance Rule (2) might be accepted, but only subject to the 
condition that the income level of no generation falls below a critical level, for 
instance, a subsistence level of income. Note that given this scenario there seems to be 
no ethical basis for discounting the income of future generations, an approach that 
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 appears to be favoured by neoclassical economics. Furthermore, zero discounting, as 
recommended by Ramsey (1928) and by Pigou (1929) is inadequate because it fails to 
take account of the avoidance by each generation of a very low level of income. 
Although Rule (1), stated above, is usually said to be based on Rawls’ principle of 
justice, it actually relies on only part of that rule. Rawls stated that income of 
individuals should be equal unless inequality is to the advantage of all, that is that 
unless inequality results in Rule (5) above being satisfied. Let us now consider the 
implications of the above criteria for alternative scenarios for forestry development. 
Case I is illustrated in Figure 4. In this model the human race is assumed to continue 
to exist until tn. Two strategies for forestry are considered: (1) a low level of 
conversion to alternative uses and (2) a medium level of conversion to alternative uses. 
Income per capita follows the path ABC if option (1) is adopted and path ADE if 
option (2) is selected. Path ADE is Paretian dominant but does not satisfy the 
sustainability criterion that each generation be no worse off than its preceding 
generation (Rule 1 above). After point D, each generation is worse off than its 
predecessor if a policy of medium forest conversion is adopted. Nevertheless, if only 
an anthropocentric perspective in adopted, this is the socially optimal strategy. 
to 
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y 
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Figure 4:  A case in which a medium level of forest conversion does not satisfy 
the intergeneration income sustainability rule (Rule 1) but is socially 
optimal based on Pareto’s criterion. 
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 Case II is more problematic because Paretian dominance is absent. In this case, a 
strategy for a high degree of conversion of forested lands to alternative uses provides 
greater income to earlier born generations but lower incomes to generations born later 
compared to a low forest conversion strategy. ABC represents the income path with a 
low forest conversion strategy and ADBE represents that with a high conversion 
strategy. Which option is socially preferable? If the high conversion path yields the 
highest level of expected income per capita then it is arguably socially preferable 
provided it does not result in the income per capita of any generation falling below an 
agreed critical level. However, if it does not maximize expected per capita income or 
if it does not meet the minimum per capita income restriction, then it would be 
rejected given that a combination of conditions (2) and (4) listed above is socially 
desirable. In that case, the sustainable development path ABC would be the most 
desirable. 
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Figure 5: A case in which Paretian dominance is absent. In this case, the path 
satisfying the intergenerational income sustainability rule (Rule 1) 
may, but need not be, socially optimal, as explained in the text. 
5. Discussion 
From the above it can be seen that it is not always rational to apply the 
intergenerational sustainability of income rule, (Rule 1). This is most clearly so when 
it conflicts with Pareto’s rule, as was illustrated by Figure 4. The application of this 
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 sustainability rule is irrational in this case even though those who exist at time D and 
beyond will be disappointed that succeeding generations will be less well off than 
they are. 
While the above is a significant (and general) result, it ought to be kept in mind that 
the intergenerational modeling used above has limitations. For example, the 
assumption is probably unrealistic that the total number of people who will live is 
given and their distribution between generations also is given. Levels of human 
population can be controlled to some extent and are subject to endogenous influences 
within socio-economic systems. 
It is also relevant to note that exploration of theoretical possibilities involving 
sustainability has advanced well beyond empirical evidence for assessing these 
possibilities. As a result, the relative economic benefits from many alternative long-
term development strategies are uncertain. Consequently, choices between alternative 
development paths have to be made under conditions of uncertainty. Hence, apart 
from possible uncertainty about the generation into which an individual might be born, 
this additional source of uncertainty needs to be taken into account. Therefore, 
decisions have to be made about the level of risk to which future generations should 
be exposed. For example, to what extent should a precautionary approach be adopted 
in selecting a development path? This matter is far from resolved in the academic 
literature and in current policy formulation, as for example outlined in Tisdell 
(forthcoming). 
An additional aspect when considering forest conversion and conservation is how 
wide to cast the analysis of sustainability issues. Should the focus be on local, 
regional, national or global economic sustainability consequences? Analysis at these 
levels can proceed in two steps: (1) assessing the impacts of forestry policy on the 
sustainability of focal variables and (2) the desirability of these impacts. Many 
questions remain unanswered in this context. For example, to what extent should 
sustainability of local incomes, culture etc. be pursued if this means that national 
income is lower than otherwise? 
11 
 Another important issue is to the extent to which it is socially desirable to replace 
natural forests by plantations. Usually, forest plantations are monocultures or include 
only a very limited number of tree varieties. Consequently, many of the (ecosystem) 
functions of natural forests are lost, in particular biodiversity within the forest is 
reduced. Nonetheless, forest plantations may be more productive in providing 
commercial timber and may sequester significant amounts of CO2. On the other hand, 
some forest plantations are fertilized and this, together with silviculture operations, 
adds to CO2 emissions. 
While governments (for example the EU) have given considerable attention to 
policies to maintain multifunctional attributes of agriculture (Tisdell and Hartley, 
2008, pp.76-80), much less attention has been given to the goal of maintaining the 
multifunctionality of forestry. Most forests in Europe now consist of plantations and 
worldwide, the area of land used for forest plantations is growing (Tisdell, 2005, 
Ch.8). Given this development, the economics and social desirability of sustaining the 
multifunctionality of forests would benefit from greater research. 
6. Conclusion 
This discussion of the management of forests for sustainable development has raised 
several issues about the extent to which natural forests should be conserved, altered or 
converted to serve non-forest purposes. Neoclassical economic theory indicates that 
some alteration in natural forests and the conversion of forested lands to alternative 
purposes is likely to minimize economic scarcity. However, the type of models 
typically employed to apply neoclassical economics do not give adequate attention to 
the needs of future generations. Neo-Malthusian economic theory also suggests that 
some conversion of land containing natural forests to alternative purposes can add to 
economic welfare and be compatible with economic sustainability. Empirically, 
however, the extent to which this conversion is compatible with economic 
sustainability remains unresolved. Nevertheless, as demonstrated, the critical point at 
which conversion of forests is incompatible with continuing sustainability of per 
capita income is not unique. It depends on the status of other natural resources. 
12 
 Intergenerational equity involving the use of forested land (and other natural 
resources) was shown to be a complicated matter. While the sustainability rule that 
the income per capita (well being) of each succeeding generation should not be less 
than that of its predecessor has philosophical appeal and empirical support., it was 
shown that it is not always rational to adopt a development policy that satisfies this 
rule. Furthermore, there is no ethical reason for discounting future incomes and while 
zero discounting (as recommended by Ramsey and Pigou) is justifiable, the stream of 
income that maximizes undiscounted income may not maximize social welfare. This 
is because it could result in the income levels of some generations falling below 
acceptable levels. Apart from these matters, there are still several unresolved 
sustainability issues, as mentioned in the previous section. 
The above discussion is not intended to belittle the importance of debating and 
assessing the sustainability attributes of alternative economic development strategies. 
However, it makes it clear that strategies which achieve sustainable economic 
development (defined as satisfying Rule 1 above) are not always socially desirable. Of 
course, some strategies that fail to achieve sustainable development may be even 
worse. In other words, the answer to whether a development strategy is desirable does 
not depend primarily on whether it achieves sustainable development. We need to 
take into account additional factors. 
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